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COMPETENCY AND CREDIBILITY: DOUBLE TROUBLE
FOR CHILD VICTIMS OF SEXUAL OFFENSES
I. INTRODUCTION
Sexual assaults, especially those upon children, remain a major concern to both law enforcement officials and the public.' A startling report
issued by the National Center for Juvenile Justice reveals that one in seven
victims of all sexual assaults are under the age of six, and one in three are
under the age of eleven. 2 Prosecutors who handle these crimes against
young children face lingering issues surrounding both the competency of
children as witnesses and public skepticism associated with victims of sex
crimes. 3
In many cases of child sexual abuse and assault, the child's account
of the crime constitutes the prosecution's entire case against the defendant.4 Thus, the testimony of the child becomes especially important to the
prosecution of the case. 5 Defense attorneys rely on the absence of corroborating evidence and the Victim's age to demand that fundamental fairness
to the accused requires a psychiatric examination of the child victim for
purposes of assessing competency or credibility. 6 Requiring a child victim
of sexual abuse to submit to a psychiatric exam, however, conflicts with
the overarching policies of encouraging victims to come forward and protecting the privacy interests of particularly vulnerable victims. 7 The nationwide disparity in the treatment of compelled psychiatric examinations
for child victims of sexual crimes reflects the courts' difficulties in balancing these competing interests. 8
See HOWARD N. SNYDER, PHD., NATIONAL CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, SEXUAL
ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN AS REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, INCIDENT,
AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS
2 Id. at 2.

(2000).

3 See Ballard v. Superior Court of San Diego, 410 P.2d 838, 846 (1966) (citing 3 J.

Wigmore, Evidence § 924a. (1940)).
4 Robin W. Morey, The Competencv Requirement Pir the Child Victim of Sexual
Abuse: Must We Abandon It?, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 245, 245-46 (1985).
5 Id. at 246. Children are often limited by immaturity, suggestibility and inexperience. Id. at 251.
6 See generally Ballard, 410 P.2d at 846 (emphasizing frequency of uncorroborated
allegations in sexual assault cases).
7 See id. at 847-49 (acknowledging import of privacy rights of victims).
" See State v. Gregg, 602 P.2d 85, 89-90 (Kan. 1979) (categorizing different jurisdictional approaches to compelled psychiatric examinations). The Supreme Court of Kansas
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This Note explores the various ways courts across the country balance the rights of child victims of sex crimes against a defendant's constitutional guarantee to a fair trial. Part II provides a historic analysis of the
origins of the skepticism related to the competency of children as witnesses
as well as credibility issues surrounding victims of sexual crimes. Part III
explores legislative and judicial methods used by various states to address
compelled psychiatric examinations of children. Part IV analyzes the implications of these approaches in the context of the right of the accused to a
fair trial, the policy goals of protecting young victims of sexual crimes, and
the state's desire to encourage victims to come forward. Part V recommends isolating the competency issues from the credibility issues as the
most appropriate way to strike a balance for the defendant, the child victim
and the whole of society.
II. SKEPTICISM OF COMPETENCY THE COMPETENCY OF
CHILDREN AND CREDIBILITY OF VICTIMS OF SEXUAL CRIMES

A.

Competency of Children

Until 1974, many states adopted common law principles suggesting
children younger than a certain age were presumptively incompetent to
testify. 9 For example, prior to the adoption of statutes regarding the presumptive competency of all witnesses, South Carolina followed the common law which presumed that a child is incompetent until age fourteen.' 0
Some commentators suggest that a child's tendency to mix fact with fantasy limits their viability as witnesses." Concerned that a child's imprecise statements would "be irretrievably engraved on the record by a guileless witness with no conception that they are incorrect," scholars seriously

categorized the approaches as follows: (1) The court has no inherent power to compel psychiatric examination; (2) the defendant has an absolute right to an order compelling a psychiatric examination; and (3) the trial judge has the discretion to order a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness where a compelling reason is shown. Id. at 89. The
court's analysis indicated that the vast majority of jurisdictions fell into the third category
and relied on Ballard for support. Id.
') Morey, supra note 4, at 251. Many states adopted versions the Federal Rules of
Evidence or the 1974 Uniform Rules of Evidence approximately stating that "[elvery person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules." FED. R. EvID.
601.
10 See South Carolina Department of Social Services v. Doe, 355 S.E.2d 543, 547
(S.C. Ct. App. 1987). The South Carolina legislature later adopted S.C. CODE 1976 ANN §
19-11-25 which embraces the principle that all witnesses are presumed competent to testify.
S.C. CODE 1976 ANN § 19-11-25 was repealed in 1995 by 1995 S.C. Acts 104 § 7.
1 Morey, supra note 4, at 251 (fearing imprecise statements of a child would confuse
jury).
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questioned whether children should be allowed to testify at all.1 2 Yet even
early common law rejected such an absolute refusal.' 3 In a 1779 English
4
child sexual abuse case, The King v. Braiser,1
where the child involved
did not testify at the trial, the English court declared that children are not
automatically disqualified from testifying because of their age.' 5 Instead
the relevant question
involved the witness' understanding of the obligation
6
to tell the truth.'
By the end of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court of the
United States relied on Braiser to reject the common law notion that a fiveyear-old was incompetent to testify. '" Acceptance of children as witnesses
at common law was only part of a more inclusive approach to competency
generally.' 8 Other categories of previously excluded witnesses included
parties to the suit, spouses of a party to the suit, and convicted felons.' 9
The court disqualified them because "the nature of human passions and
12

Morey, supra note 4, at 245 (citing Meyers, When Children Take the Stand, 11:1

Student Law. 14, 15 (Sept. 1982). Often in abuse cases "the eyewitness testimony of the
youngster involved may be the only direct link between the child and the offender; any
other evidence is generally circumstantial physical evidence that indicates only that the
abuse was committed." Id.
13 Id. at 248-49 (providing historical context of competency statutes). Even
in nineteenth century England, children were allowed to testify as long as the child understood the
obligation to tell the truth. Id.
14 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779).
15 Morey, supra note 4, at 249 citing with approval The King v. Braiser,
168 Eng.
Rep. 202 (1779). The English court singled out the obligation to tell the truth as the only
critical test of competency. Morey, supra note 4, at 249. As long as the child realized the
danger of a lie, there should be no fixed rule to exclude competency. See Braiser, 168 Eng.
Rep. at 201.
16 Morey, supra note 4, at 249. "[It is understood that] no testimony whatever
can be
legally received except upon oath; and that an infant, though under the age of seven years
maybe sworn in a criminal prosecution, provided such infant appears, on strict examination
by the Court, to posses a sufficient knowledge of the nature and consequences of the oath..
•for there is no precise or fixed rules as to the time within which infants are excluded from
giving evidence; but their admissibility depends on the sense and reason they entertain of
the danger and impiety of falsehood, which is to be collected from their answers to questions propounded to them by the Court; but if they are found to be incompetent, their testimony cannot be received." Braiser, 168 Eng. Rep. at 202.
17 See Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523 (1895) (emphasizing child's ability to
tell the truth).
18 See Morey, supra note 4, at 249 (outlining other categories of witness
deemed
incompetent). At early common law, courts deemed many parties incompetent to testify
including those who lacked religious belief who could not be bound by an oath, parties to
the suit, the spouse of a party to the suit, persons with a financial interest, naturally incapacitated persons, and convicted felons. Morey, supra note 4, at 250. Though no longer
accepted by courts as grounds for exclusion, each can be used for impeachment purposes.
Morey, supra note 4, at 250.
'9Morey, supra note 4, at 250 (citing I S. GREENLEAF, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 328
(1899)). Courts described these categories of witnesses as particularly distrustful. I S.
GREENLEAF, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 328 (1899).

116

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. IX

actions [suggests] there is more reason to distrust such biased testimony
than to believe it. 'a ° As the nineteenth century progressed, the common
law gradually expanded to include these types of witnesses and left the
question of credibility to the jurors. 2' Children however, remained vulnerable to competency statutes 2
By 1974, the Federal Rules of Evidence 601 and the 1974 Uniform
Rules of Evidence articulated these evolving common law principles by
providing that "every person" is competent to testify.' Based on this broad
24
standard, courts disqualify few witnesses on competency grounds.
Even
an adjudication of "feeblemindedness" or the fact that a witness has spent
time in a mental institution does not render a witness incompetent. 25 As
long as a witness possesses sufficient knowledge of the nature and consequences of the oath and an ability to communicate with the jury,
the judge
26

exercises discretion in favor of allowing the witness to testify.

When the question of competency arises relative to a child, the
judge orders a competency hearing.2 7 During a typical competency hearing, the judge inquires about the child's name, where he attends school, his
age, whether he knows what a lie is, and whether he knows what happens
if he tells a lie.2- The simplistic nature of the competency hearing reflects
the singular intent of the judge to determine the ability of a child witness to

2"

See Morey, supra note 4, at 250 (citing I S.

GREENLEAF, LAW OF EVIDENCE

§ 328

(1899)).

21 See Morey, supra note 4, at 250. Scholars recognized the danger of such a broad

standard but opined on the benefits: "Conceding the jury's deficiencies, the remedy of excluding such witnessles] [of minimum credibility], who may be the only person available
who knows the facts, seems inept and primitive. Though the tribunal is unskilled, and the
testimony difficult to weigh, on balance it is still better to let the evidence come in for what
it is worth with cautionary instructions." McCormick, Evidence 62 at 267-69 (5th ed. 1999).
22 See e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (Burns Supp. 1985) ("Children under ten
[10] years of age [are not competent], unless it appears that they understand the nature and
obligation of the oath"): Louisiana: LA REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-469 West 1981) ("[N]o child
less than twelve years of age shall, over the objection either of the district attorney, be
sworn as a witness, until the court is satisfied, after examination, that such child has sufficient understanding to be a witness.")- New York: N.Y. Crim Proc. Law § 60.20 (Consol.
1979) ("A child less than twelve years old may not testify under oath unless the court is
satisfied that he understands the nature of an oath").
23 FED R. EvID. 601, 1974 UNIF.R. EVID. 601. The federal rule adds a second sentence

providing that state competency laws prevail where state laws of evidence eliminate all
competency requirements. See Morey, supra, note 4 at 251 (citing with approval Goodman, Children's Testimony in Historical Perspective, 40:2 J. Soc. Issues 12, 14 (1984)).
24 Henry Weihofen, Testimonial Competency and Credibility, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
53(1965).
25 HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE, §601.2 (Michael H. Graham 2003).
26 Id.

27 18 U.S.C. §3509 §(c)(9). "A psychiatric examination of a child shall be made "only
upon written motion and offer of proof of incompetence by a party." Id.
28 See Morey supra note 4, at 263.
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"recall, recount and relate" factual matters.
The competency hearing
purposefully avoids issues directly related to the trial because those matters
remain the province of the jury. 3 The jury, not the judge, determines how
much weight, if any, should be given to a child victim's testimony.
The judge, however, can only allow testimony deemed relevant to
the proceedings. 2 If the witness by reason of age, retardation, injury,
medication, or illness is so severely deficient that a reasonable juror could
not put any credence in the testimony of the witness, the court must find
the witness incompetent to testify.3 3 Thus, to a certain extent, competency
must be viewed through the lens of credibility as well. 4
B.

Credibility of Victims of Sexual Assaults

Assuming a child victim witness of a sex crime satisfies the minimal credibility standard required for competency, defense attorneys could
raise the possibility of unfair prejudice created by a lack of credibility as
yet another way to exclude the witness) 5 In the case of sexual assaults on
young victims, defense attorneys frequently revisit the settled competency
issues by coupling the child's age with historic assumptions about victims
of sex crimes to suggest that child victims of sexual crimes are inherently
not credible. 36
In the late 1950's, courts required complaining witnesses of a sex
violation to undergo a psychiatric examination if their testimony was un37
corroborated.
Prominent psychiatrists explained that many women or
29 See People v. Espinoza, 95 Cal. App. 4th 1287, 1310-12 (2002) (distinguishing role

ofjudge in determining competency from jury's role of weighing evidence).
'o Id. at 1311.
3'See Commonwealth v. Widrick, 467 N.E.2d 1353, 1357 (Mass. 1984) (emphasizing differences between questions of competency and credibility).
32 HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE, §601.2 (Michael H. Graham 2003).

33 See Morey, supra note 4, at 258-62 (analyzing subtle overlap in competency and
credibility issues).
34See Morey, supra note 4, at 258-62 (discussing evidentiary requirements of relevancy for admissibility).
35 See FED. R. EVID. 403. Rule 403 provides for the exclusion of relevant evidence on
grounds of prejudice, confusion or waste of time. Id. "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id.
36 See infra notes 37-39 (discussing credibility concerns of legal scholars).
37See Ballard, 410 P.2d at 846 (citing ROSCOE N. GRAY; LOUISE J. GORDY;
ATTORNEYS' TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE (3d ed. (1950)). "Pseudologia phantastica is described as a mental condition involving a mixture of lies and imagination. Not infrequently
this is the basis of the alleged sexual assault. Girls assert that they have been raped, sometimes recounting as true a story they have heard falsely naming individuals or describing
them." ROSCOE N. GRAY; LOUISE J. GORDY; ATIrORNEYS' TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE at 940

(3d ed. (1950)).

Professor Wigmore's remark that

"[N]o judge should ever let a sex-
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girls could falsely accuse a man of a crime as a result of a mental condition. 38 The psychiatrists reasoned that such a charge might flow from an
"aggressive tendency directed to the person or from a childish desire for
notoriety. ' 39 The early 1960's signaled a significant retreat from this harsh
rule. 40 Rather than support the mandatory requirement for a psychiatric
examination, courts exercised discretion when the defendant presented
compelling reasons for such an examination. 4' For example, the Supreme
Court of California suggested that such compelling reasons would generally arise if there were little or no corroboration and the defense raised the
issue of the effect of the complaining witness' mental or emotional condition upon veracity. 42 While the shift toward judicial discretion represented
a welcome change for victims of sexual abuse, the court still implied a
corroboration requirement for victims of sexual crimes. 43 Unlike victims
of other types of crimes who are not subject to the possibility of a compelled psychiatric examination, victims of sexual crimes remain vulnerable. 44
Legislatures began to address the special concerns regarding victims
of sex crimes in the mid to late 1970's in the form of Rape Shield Statutes. 5 Rape Shield Statutes prevent the introduction at trial of evidence
relating to the reputation of a victim's sexual conduct. 46 The Massachuoffense charge go to the jury unless the female complainant's social history and mental
makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified physician," reflected this mindset. 3A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EvIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 924 (a), at 737
(Chadbourn rev. 1970).
31 See Ballard, 410 P.2d at 846.
39 Gray, supra note 42, at 940.
40 See generally Ballard, 410 P.2d at 849 (dismissing Wigmore's assessment in favor
of balanced approach). "Rather than formulate a fixed rule in this matter we believe that
discretion should repose in the trial judge to order a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness in a case involving a sex violation if the defendant presents a compelling
reason for such an examination." Id.
41 Id.

42 See id. (adopting the middle ground between absolute prohibition and absolute

requirement).
43 See Widrick, 467 N.E.2d at 1357 (emphasizing creation of corroboration requirement in the instance of a sex crime).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1358. The Massachusetts legislature adopted its' Rape Shield Statute, MASS
GEN. LAWS ch. 233 § 21 B in 1977. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts relied on
the legislative history of the Rape Shield statute indicating that the legislature intended to
provide an atmosphere where victims would come forward. Id.
46 MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 233 § 21B (1977). Section 21 B provides "[elvidence of the
reputation of a victim's sexual conduct shall not be admissible in any investigation or proceeding before a grand jury or any court of the commonwealth . . . Evidence of specific
instances of a victim's sexual conduct in such an investigation or proceeding shall not be
admissible except evidence of the victim's sexual conduct with the defendant or evidence of
recent conduct of the victim alleged to be the cause of any physical feature, characteristic,
or condition of the victim; provided, however that such evidence shall be admissible only
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setts Supreme Judicial Court relied on the state's Rape Shield Statute when
refusing a petitioner's request for a psychiatric evaluation of a complaining
witness in a sex crime.47 The court stated that the statute "was aimed at
eliminating a common defense strategy of trying the complaining witness
rather than the defendant. 4 8 This defense strategy often resulted in harassment and further humiliation of the victim as well as discouraging victims of rape from reporting the crimes to law enforcement authorities.49 In
1978, the North Carolina Supreme Court echoed a similar sentiment stating, "zealous concern for the 50accused is not justification for a grueling and
harassing trial of the victim.
By 1980, the California Legislature eliminated a trial judge's discretion to compel a victim of a sex crime to undergo a psychiatric examination by adopting California Penal Code section 11 12.5' Specifically, the
law forbids courts from ordering psychiatric examinations of victims or
complaining witnesses in sex crime cases in order to assess their credibility. 52 The California Supreme Court reiterated support for this view by
declaring "previous expectational disparities that singled out the credibility
of rape complainants
as suspect, have no place in a modern system of ju53
risprudence.
Despite the enormous progress for victims of sexual crimes in states
like California, Massachusetts, and North Carolina, skepticism lingers in
other jurisdictions across the nation.54 Most jurisdictions allow the trial
judge discretion to compel an examination
when the defendant shows a
S 55
compelling need for such an evaluation.
Regardless of the form of the
test, most jurisdictions continue to treat victims of sex crimes inherently
different than victims of other crimes.56
after an in camera hearing on a written motion for admission of the same and an offer of
proof. If after the hearing, the court finds that the weight and relevancy of said evidence is
sufficient to outweigh the prejudicial effect to the victim, the evidence shall be admitted;
otherwise not." Id.
47See Widrick, 467 N.E.2d at 1357.
48

Id.
49 id.

-( See State v. Horn, 446 S.E.2d. 52, 53 (N.C. 1994) citing with approval State v.
Looney, 240 S.E.2d 612 (N.C. 1978).
51 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1112 (1980).
52 See People v. Espinoza, 95 Cal. App. 4th 1287, 1312 (2002) (citing People v.
Anderson, 22 P.3d 347, 369 (2001)).
53 See Espinoza, 95 Cal. App. 4th at 1311 (citing People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 121

(1986)).

54 See In the Interest of Michael H., No. 25529, 2002 WL 31051575, at*3 (S.C. Sept.
16, 2002) (listing Alaska, Nevada, New Jersey, Tennessee, and West Virginia as representative examples of inherent authority jurisdictions).
" See id. See also State v. Gregg, P.2d 85, 90 (Kan. 1979) (asserting vast majority of
jurisdictions use compelling needs test).
56See In the Interest of Michael H., 2002 WL 31051575, at *3 (implying victims of

120

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. IX

III. VARIOUS JURISDICTIONAL APPROACHES
The scope of authority courts have to compel child victims to submit to a psychiatric examination fall into four categories: (i) lack of authority because of a statute; (ii) lack of inherent authority; (iii) implied lack of
authority; and (iv) inherent authority subject to a balancing test.
While
the first three categories eliminate the possibility that a child victim witness may be forced to undergo a psychiatric examination, the application
of common law principles in the
final category leaves victims vulnerable to
58
an invasive psychiatric exam.
A.

Banned by Statute

California is the only state in the nation that has legislatively banned
a trial court from ordering a psychiatric examination of a complaining witness in a sex offense. Prior to the adoption of Penal Code § 1112 in 1980
which forbids such examinations, California operated under common law
principles that allowed a trial judge to compel psychiatric examinations of
victims of sexual crimes, including children.
In Ballard v. Superior
Court of San Diego County,6' the Supreme Court of California ruled that
upon the showing of compelling need by the defendant, the victim could be
compelled to submit to a psychiatric examination.62 The court suggested
that a lack of corroboration and an assertion by the defendant that there
was a connection between the "mental or emotional condition" of the complaining witness and her veracity qualified as such compelling circumstances. 63 Other cases demonstrated the difficulty in applying the compelsexual crimes deserve unique analysis).
'7 See Gregg, 602 P.2d at 89 (categorizing jurisdictions in a similar manner). The
court created three categories: (1) the court has no inherent power to compel psychiatric

examination: (2) the defendant has an absolute fight to an order compelling a psychiatric
examination; (3) the trial judge has the discretion to order a psychiatric examination of the

complaining witness where a compelling reason is shown. Id. In the first category, the
court listed the District of Columbia, Oregon, Illinois as jurisdictions that have ruled the
court has no inherent power to compel a psychiatric examination. Id. The Gregg court
opined that this has "always been a minority view and it appears to be declining even further." Id. In the second category, the court included only Indiana. Id. The court included
California and South Dakota in the category where the trial court has the discretion to order
an examination. i.
58See infra text accompanying notes 90-122.
59See People v. Espinoza, 95 Cal. App. 4th 1287, 1310 (2002) (describing modernization of treatment of victims of sex crimes).
6 See Ballard v. Superior Court, 410 P.2d 838, 847-49 (1966) (discussing relevant
common law principles); Espinoza, 95 Cal. App. 4th at 1310 (explaining Penal Code § 1112
ban of psychiatric examinations of complaining witnesses in sex-crime cases).
61 410 P.2d 838(1966).

62 Id. at 849.
63 I.
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ling need standard. 64 For example, in People v. Francis,65 involving lasciviousness toward a preteen boy, the trial court ruled that the precarious
state of the boy's mental condition suggested that exposing the child to an
intrusive psychiatric examination might be harmful to the child. 66 For precisely the same reason, the appeals court in Francis overturned the trial
court decision and demanded the examination.6 7
The legislature effectively overruled the compelling needs standard
by enacting Penal Code § 1112.68 In applying the statute in People v.
Espinoza69 in 2002, the appeals court referred to the distrust of complaining witnesses that formed the foundation of Ballard as "antiquated beliefs
that have since been disproved and discarded., 70 The statute, operating in
conjunction with the court's strong support for the legislation, reflects the
high level of protection California affords victims of sexual crimes. 7'
B. No Inherent Authority
While California acted legislatively, several jurisdictions including
North Carolina, Texas, New York, Oregon, and the District of Columbia
have ruled that their courts lack the authority to compel psychiatric examinations of victims of sexual crimes.72 Citing the constant danger of perjury
under any circumstances, these jurisdictions rely on the jury to be "the lie
detector in the court room" and will not allow a psychiatrist to bolster the
credibility of a witness. 73 In concurring that a lower court lacked authority
to compel a psychiatric examination, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
emphasized that requiring a witness to subject himself to a psychiatric examination violated the public policy of encouraging witnesses to come
forward.74
Recognizing the duty of the trial judge to protect a defendant's
rights by allowing him to provide an adequate defense, the North Carolina
64 See infra text accompanying notes 66-67 (describing different outcomes of same
test to same facts).
65

5 Cal. App.3d 414 (1970), abrogated hy CAL. PENAL CODE § 1112.

6 Id.
at 419.
67 Id. at 419-20.
68 See Espinoza, 95 Cal. App. 4th at 1310 (describing statute's effect on common
law).

95 Cal. App. 4th 1287 (2002).
Id. at 1310.
71 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1112; Espinoza, 95 Cal. App. 4th at 1310 (emphasizing
soundpublic policies of Cal. Penal Code § 1112).
7 See State v. Gregg, P.2d 85, 90 (Kan 1979) (categorizing different jurisdictions
treatment of court's inherent authority).
73 See State v. Looney, 240 S.E.2d 612, 627 (N.C. 1978) (citing U.S. v. Barnard, 490
F.2d 907,912 (9th Cir., 1973)).
74See State v. Horn, 446 S.E.2d 52, 54 (N.C. 1978)(emphasizing impact of authority
on public policy).
69

70
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court offered several potential remedies.75 First, the trial judge could allow
the defendant to employ the services of his own mental health expert and
dispute the findings of the psychological evaluations already performed on
the victim. 76 In the alternative, the judge could deny the admission of the
state's evidence of the alleged victim's mental status. 77 Finally, the case
against the defendant could be dismissed if the defendant's right to adequately present a defense is in danger.78 Thus, despite holding that the
court lacks inherent authority to compel a psychiatric examination of any
victim witness, these courts maintain other tools to protect the rights of a
defendant.79
C. Massachusetts - An Interesting Twist
Like North Carolina, Texas, New York, Oregon, and the District of
Columbia, Massachusetts agrees that the court lacks inherent authority to
compel a victim of a sexual crime to undergo a psychiatric examination. 80
In the absence of such authority, however, the Massachusetts legislature
granted the trial judge discretion to compel a psychiatric exam relative to
competency. 8 ' In Commonwealth v. Widrick,8 a defendant suggested that
83
the legislature intended the authority to extend to issues of credibility.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts firmly responded that the
absence of such language implied the exact opposite. 84 The court explained that it would have been logical for the legislature to consider psychiatric examinations relative to credibility simultaneously with competency and the failure
to do so necessarily suggests a lack of intent to extend
85
that authority.
In addition to analyzing the construction of MASS. GEN. LAW 123 §
19, the court emphasized the Massachusetts Rape Shield Statute.86 The
75 id.
76

77
78

id.
id.

Id.

79 See Horn, 446 S.E.2d at 54.
80 See supra note 54 and accompanying text (listing no inherent authority jurisdic-

tions); Commonwealth v. Widrick, 467 N.E.2d 1353,1358 (Mass. 1984) (discussing lack of
inherent authority for Massachusetts's judges to compel psychiatric exams relative to credibility).
8 See Widrick, 467 N.E.2d at 1356 (analyzing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123 § 19 (1970)
extending judge discretion to order psychiatric examination relative to competency). The
court emphasized that competency was entirely within the province of the judge. Id.
82 467 N.E.2d 1353 (Mass. 1984).
83 id. at 1355.
84
85
86

id.

Id.
See Widrick at 467 N.E.2d at 1358 (alluding to legislative intent in enacting the

Rape Shield Statute). See also Mass. Gen. Law c. 233 §21B (1977) (protecting privacy of
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court reasoned that in adopting this statute, the legislature demanded that
the complaining witness should not be put on trial. 87 Finally, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that compelling a psychiatric examination for credibility imposed a corroboration requirement where none
exists. 88 In such a case, the psychiatrist would be required to "vouch for
the witness credibility" which invades the province of the jury. While
recognizing the legislature's grant of power to the courts to compel an examination for competency, a province reserved for the trial judge, the Massachusetts courts leave the question of credibility in the hands of the jury. 90
D.

The Balancing Tests

Most jurisdictions, however, have determined that a court maintains
inherent authority to compel a psychiatric evaluation upon the showing of
substantial need or compelling need. 9' These courts find the inherent authority to grant such an examination in the duty to guarantee the defendant
a fair trial. 92 Typically, the courts apply some sort of balancing test weighing the public policy interests of encouraging victims of sexual abuse to
come forward and protecting victim's privacy rights against a defendant's
right to a fair trial.93
Interestingly, many of the courts employing the balancing tests rely
on the now legislatively overturned Ballardtest in California. 94 For example, federal judges may order a child victim witness to undergo a psychiatric examination if the defense satisfies a two-prong test demonstrating substantial need. 95 First, the defense must show a witness deviates from ac-96
ceptable norms, such as an identifiable or clinical psychiatric disorder.
Second, the defense must present evidence indicating something peculiar
that would influence the competence of the witness or the court's ability to
assess that competence. 97 For example, in Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. A.,
Leonard,98 the third circuit upheld a trial judge's denial of such a comrape victims).
87 Widrick, 467 N.E.2d at 1358.
88
89

9

id.
id.
Id.

91 See State v. Gregg, 602 P.2d 85, 89-90 (categorizing jurisdictions).
92

Id. at 90.

93 id.
94 See id. at 89 (declaring that Ballard is most cited case supporting compelling rea-

son standard). But see In the Interest of Michael H., 2002 WL 31051575, at *6 (explicitly
stating Ballardnot basis of opinion).
See Joseph v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands, 226 F.Supp. 2d 726, 732 (D.C.V.I.
2002).
9 id.
97 id.

98 922 F.2d 1141 (3d Cir. 1991).
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pelled examination of the child witness because the defendant's daughters,
aged thirteen and ten, (1) "were not of such tender years that their ability to
perceive the events and recount them were doubtful" and, (2) did not suffer
from mental illness; and therefore, the defendant failed to demonstrate a
substantial need. 99 Similarly, in Joseph v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands, the
court denied a defendant's request because the victim was thirteen and
capable of adequately perceiving and recounting events.' ° °
South Dakota likewise employs a substantial needs test but defines
it differently than the federal government. ° Unlike the federal government which uses the test to assess reliability of the testimony, South Dakota applies it to identify distortions of perceptions that might affect the
credibility of the complaining witness.10 2 In applying the test to a defense
request that a five-year-old child victim undergo a psychiatric exam when
an interview with an independent forensic examiner had already been
videotaped, the Supreme Court of South Dakota upheld the trial court's
denial of the request. 103 The critical factors influencing the court included
the trauma to the child, the fact that the child actually testified, and the fact
that the defense had the opportunity to have its own expert review the
videotape of the independent forensic interview. 104
West Virginia courts weigh a similar set of factors but require a
showing of compelling need. 05 In State v. Delaney," the defendant asserted that the court violated his constitutional due process rights by denying his request to access the victims for psychological examinations. 107 In
support of the lower court's ruling, the Supreme Court of West Virginia
emphasized the victims' young ages and the availability of a psychologist

A., Leonard, 922 F.2d at 1142.
1ooJoseph, 226 F.Supp. 2d at 733.
MI State v. Osgood, 667 N.W.2d 687, 691-92 (S.D. 2003).
99

Id. at 693-94. Among the factors to be considered are: (1) the victim's age; (2) the
nature of the examination and whether it would further traumatize the victim; (3) whether
the prosecution employed a similar expert; (4) whether the evidence already available to the
defendant suffices for the purposes sought; (5) whether there is a reasonable basis for believing that the child's mental or emotional state may have affected the child's veracity; (6)
102

whether evidence of the crime has little or no corroboration beyond the testimony of the

victim; (7) whether there is other evidence available for the defendant's use; and (8)
whether the child will be able to testify. Id.

'0' Id. at 694.
104 id.
105

See State v. Delaney, 417 S.E.2d 903 (W. Va. 1992). The test lists: (1) the nature of

the examination requested and the intrusiveness of such an examination; (2) the victim's
age; (3) the resulting effects of the examination on the victim; (4) the probative value to the
issue before the court; (5) the remoteness in time of the examination to the alleged criminal
act; and (6) the evidence already available for the defendant's use. Id. at 907.
'06 417 S.E.2d 903 (W. Va. 1992).
'07 Id. at 906.
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to assist with evaluation and cross-examination of the state's expert testimony.
South Carolina employs the same compelling needs test outlined in
Delanev but limits its application to children.'I9 The Supreme Court of
South Carolina held that "cases involving child victims could raise unique
concerns that may necessitate a psychiatric examination of the child victim
in order to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial." '"10 In the case, In the
Interest of Michael H., "'1the child victim admitted to hearing voices in his
head that told him to say and do mean things to his friends.1 12 In light of
the Delaney factors, the court held that the victim's young age (four at the
time of the assault, six at the time of trial), the fact that the victim was undergoing counseling, his ability to speak freely about the incident, and the
fact that the victim had heard these voices during the year of3 the alleged
assault were reasons compelling the psychiatric examination."
Kansas uses the compelling needs standard but does not define it as
clearly as the courts in West Virginia and South Carolina. 1 4 In State v.
Gregg,"l5 the Supreme Court of Kansas suggested that compelling reasons
included evidence of a child's mental instability, lack of veracity, similar
charges against other men proven to be false, or any reason why a particular child should be required to submit to such an examination.'6 In State v.
Bourassa,117 the trial court ruled that a child victim who had previously
accused her father (not the defendant) of sexually assaulting her, had mutilated two kittens, had a tendency of soiling her pants, had been treated with
Prozac, and received mental health counseling for behavioral disorders
should not be subject to a psychiatric examination." 8 In denying the defendant's request, the lower court explained that this was not a "he said/she
said" case, and though the previous accusation against her father was not
ultimately supported by charges being filed, the allegation was supported
by other corroborating evidence." 19 On an abuse of discretion standard, the
o Id. at 907-08.
'09 In the Interest of Michael H., No. 25529, 2002 WL 31051575, at*3 (S.C. Sept. 16,

2002).

1 0 Id. at *4.

...No. 25529, 2002 WL 31051575, at*3 (S.C. SC. Sept. 16, 2002).
112 I. at *1.
113 Id. at *5.
'14

State v. Gregg, 602 P.2d 85, 91 (Kan. 1979).

115 602 P.2d 85 (Kan. 1979).

116 Id.
117 15 P.3d 835 (Kan. 1999).
18 Id. at 839-40.
"9 Id. at 840. The court makes no reference to the Kansas Rape Shield Law which

excludes "evidence of the complaining witness' previous sexual conduct with any other
person including the defendant. KAN STAT. ANN. § 21-3525 (1976). Contrast with Massachusetts who relies on its Rape Shield Statute as evidence the courts lacks the authority to
compel a psychiatric examination. See supra text accompanying notes 83-90.
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appeal's court overturned the motion judge, holding
that "no reasonable
20
ruling.
court's
motion
the
adopt
would
person"
Nevada employed a similar compelling needs test, but up until 2000
it was the victim who had to show a compelling need to be protected by the
state. 121 In Lickey v. State, 122 the court held that unless the prosecution
presents competent evidence of a compelling reason to protect the victim, a
defendant is entitled to have the victim undergo an independent psychiatric
examination. 123 Acknowledging that Lickey effectively shifted the burden
away from the defendant, the Supreme Court of Nevada now requires a
defense showing of compelling need based on the state's intent to obtain
benefit from a psychiatric expert, the availability of corroborating evidence
and the reasonableness of the belief that the victim witness' mental or emotional state may affect his/her veracity. 124
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE VARIOUS APPROACHES
Children remain particularly vulnerable in jurisdictions that still
employ balancing tests, however sparingly.' 25 Despite the claim that children are presumptively competent witnesses, these jurisdictions consistently use the type of crime and the age of the child to revisit well-settled
competency issues.126 Although the balancing tests reflect care and concern for the child victim, application of the various tests yields inconsistent
results depending on the individual judge and the jurisdiction of the

crime. 127
Until the California legislature abrogated Ballard, the balancing test
in use yielded different results depending on the judge. 28 For example, the
lower court in People v. Francis 29 viewed the boy's precarious mental
condition as a factor weighing in favor of denying an intrusive psychiatric
examination, but the appeals court offered his fragile mental state as a
compelling reason to order the examination. 30 In denying the examina120

State v. Bourassa, 15 P.3d 835, 839 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999). The standard of review

after denial of defense motion to compel a psychiatric examination in a sex crime case is
abuse of discretion. Id. "Judicial discretion is abused when no reasonable person would
take the view adopted by the court." Id.
121 See Koerschner v. State, 13 P.3d 451, 454 (Nev. 2000)(shifting burden back to

defendant).
122 827 P.2d 824 (Nev. 1992).
123 Id. at 826.
124 See Koerschner, 13 P.3d at 455.
125 See supra notes 91-124 and accompanying text.
126

See supra text accompanying notes 91-124.

127 See
128

infra text accompanying notes 128-43.

See People v. Francis, 5 Cal. App. 3d 414, 419 (1970) (describing different out-

come at trial court level).
129

5 Cal. App. 3d 414 (1970).

131

id. at 419.
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tion, the lower court expressed its concern for the victim because he was
"about to crack up" from the strain of the trial.'13 Conversely, the appeals
court overturned that decision because the lower court should have "considered the emotional and mental condition of the witness" as a reason to
grant the motion for psychiatric examination instead of denying it. I32
Kansas represents a similarly disjunctive situation.133 In Bourassa,
the appeals court overturned the trial judge on an abuse of discretion standard even though the lower court listed two specific reasons for denying
the motion. 34 In holding the motion judge's reasons "insufficient to deny
the defendant's motion," the appeals court suggests a shift of the burden of
proving compelling circumstances from the defense to the prosecution to
show why the factors are not compelling. 35 This burden shift contravenes
the letter and spirit of the Kansas Rape
Shield Statute, which is designed to
36
protect victims of sexual offenses. 1
Application of the substantial or compelling needs tests varies depending not only on which judge hears the case, but also on the jurisdiction
in which the crime against the child victim occurs. 137 South Dakota and
West Virginia courts indicate that the younger the child, the more trauma
involved for the young victim and the less likely the court would be to order such an examination.1 38 In Nevada, where the courts only recently
rejected the presumption that the prosecution must show a compelling reason why the child victim should be protected, the mere existence of the old
standard suggests an increased likelihood that a child could face a compelled psychiatric examination. 139 South Carolina's approach, however,
implies the strongest likelihood of a compelled psychiatric examination. 140
In granting defendant's request for a psychiatric examination of the child,
the Supreme Court of South Carolina specifically limited the authority of
the court only to cases where the child is the complaining witness.14' By
emphasizing the "unique concerns" regarding children and limiting its'
holding to child victims of sex crimes, the court reveals an inclination to
131

Id.

132 id.

133 See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
134 See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.

135State v. Bourassa, 15 P.3d 835, 840 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999). See Koerschner v. State,
13 P.3d 451,455 (Nev. 2000) (explaining burden shift created by forcing prosecution to
show compelling need for victim to be protected). Though burden shift not expressly stated
by the Kansas court, the appeals court holding suggests the same analysis as the Nevada
court.
136 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
137See supra notes 101-13, 116-20 and accompanying text.
138 See supra notes 101-13 and accompanying text.
139 See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
140 See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
141See supra, notes 108-11 and accompanying text.

128

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. IX

compel a psychiatric examination for younger children. 142 Therefore,
whether the court compels a child victim witness of a sexual crime to undergo an intrusive
psychiatric exam largely depends on the jurisdiction of
43
the crime. 1
V. COMMITMENT TO EXISTING STATUTES
Child victims of sexual crimes need protection from the state. A
parent of such a child would be reluctant to pursue charges if the process
involves even more trauma to the child. In order to pursue the public policy
interests in encouraging victims to come forward without neglecting the
responsibility of providing a fair trial to the defendant, courts need only
rely on broad competency statutes and Rape Shield statutes.
While the constitutional requirement of a fair trial to a defendant is
clear, the skepticism surrounding young victims of sexual crimes blurs the
court's duties owed to them. There is no reason to create a different evidentiary standard for child victim witnesses of sexual crimes. Even in the
circumstances of In the Interest of Michael H., where the child witness
heard voices in his head, the defendant still can rely on traditional courtroom tools such as cross-examination to challenge the child's credibility.
In the absence of full commitment to the competency statutes and Rape
Shield statutes, the resolution of this unfair skepticism toward child victims
of sexual crimes lies in the hands of the various state legislatures.
Jane Dever Prince

142

In the Interest of Michael H., No. 25529, 2002 WL 31051575, at *3, *4 (S.C. Sept.

16, 2002).
143 See supra notes 128-42 and accompanying text.

